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IN PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE:
THE FIRST FOUR-YEAR TERM OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
Stuart Beresford'
I. INTRODUCTION
Although often eclipsed by its counterpart, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (the Yugoslavia Tribunal), the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (the Tribunal) has achieved
significant results during the first four-year term of its existence. During
this period, the Tribunal has issued twenty-eight public indictments against
forty-eight individuals, of whom thirty-eight are in custody. Two trials have
been completed resulting in three convictions, and a further two
individuals, including the former Rwandan Prime Minister, have pleaded
guilty to the charges against them. Despite these achievements, the
Tribunal has been plagued internally by administrative and managerial
problems that have had the potential to undermine the considerable
efforts undertaken by its staff to bring to justice the perpetrators of one of
this century's worst genocides. Although this article examines primarily
the legislative history of the Tribunal during its integral term (which ended
25 May 1999) and the administrative, investigative and judicial work
undertaken, it also identifies a number of problems the Tribunal has
encountered, as well as the means taken to resolve them.
t Associate Legal Officer, Registry ICTY. LLB, BSc (majoring in psychology), LLM
with distinction, University of Otago. Formerly: Temporary Legal Officer, Secretariat,
European Court of Human Rights. Member of the Bar Association of New Zealand. The
views expressed herein are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the United Nations or the ICTY. Author's Note: Since this article was written,
several moTe indictments have been confirmed by the ICTR and judgements have been
rendered in the cases of the following accused: Clement Kayishema, Obed Ruzindana,
Alfred Musema, Georges Rutaganda and Georges Ruggiu.
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II. BACKGROUND
On 6 April 1994, a plane carrying the Presidents of Rwanda and
Burundi, Juvenal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira respectively, was
shot down by unknown assailants as it was about to land in the Rwandan
capital, Kigali.' During the next three months, Rwanda was plunged into a
genocidal frenzy, which culminated in the deaths of between 500,000 and
one million people and the displacement of one-third of the country's eight
million inhabitants.2
Rwanda had been the most densely populated country in Africa and
its mostly rural population spoke Kinyarwanda, a Bantu language? While
85% of its population were Hutu, 14% Tutsi and 1% Batwa, generations
of intermarriage had substantially reduced inter-population physical
differences. 4 However, European colonists-by exploiting the existing
social divisions to facilitate their own indirect rule-accentuated rather
than diminished the social differences between the Hutu and Tutsi
populations. Believing that they were more intelligent and better equipped
to govern, the Tutsis were provided access to education and social
institutions at the expense of the Hutu.5
With the end of colonialism imminent, the Belgian authorities began
to support Hutu aspirations for a greater role in their country's affairs,
believing that minority rule was unsustainable and fearful of the pan-
African tendencies which they discerned among the Tutsi ruling class.6 As
1. Sam Kiley, Tribal Violence Flares in Rwandan Capital, TIMES (London), Apr. 8, 1994,
at 12.
2. According to a report submitted by R. Degni-Segui, Special Rapporteur of the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights,
the number of persons killed throughout the territory is to be numbered
in the hundreds of thousands, estimates ranging from 200,000 to 500,000.
In fact, even the latter figure is probably less than the reality. Some
observers think that the figure is close to a million. It is not sure that the
exact number of victims will ever be known.
U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 51" Sess., S 24, U.N. Doe. EICN.4/19957 (1994).
3. Rwanda is divided into ten prefectures (Butare, Byumba, Cyangugu, Gikongoro,
Gisenyi, Gitarama, Kibungo, Kibuye, Kigali and Ruhengeri) each of which is governed by a
prefect. The prefectures are further subdivided into communes, which are placed under the
authority of bourgmestres. The bourgmestre of each commune is appointed by the
President of the Republic upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior.
4. Paul Magnarella, Expanding the Frontiers of Humanitarian Law: The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L. 421, 422 (1994). See also GERARD
PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 5 (1995).
5. The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement $ 82, Sept. 2, 1998.
6. FERGAL KEANE, SEASON OF BLOOD: A RWANDAN JOURNEY 18 (1995).
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power passed to the Hutu, years of built-up resentment led to periodic
outbreaks of violence against the Tutsis, forcing tens of thousands to flee
to neighbouring countries.
In 1973, Habyarimana came to power through a military coup.
Following a trend common at the time on the African continent, President
Habyarimana introduced the one-party system with the creation of the
National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development
(Mouvement Rdvolutionnaire National pour le D6velopement or
"MRND") of which every Rwandan was a member. Although he claimed
to share power, most key positions went to Hutu from the region of his
birthplace in northwestern Rwanda. Furthermore, President Habyarimana
promoted a policy of discrimination against the Tutsi. During his rule there
were no Tutsi bourgmestre or prefects, only one Tutsi military officer, two
members of parliament and one Tutsi cabinet minister. Hutu in the
military were prohibited from marrying Tutsis; all citizens were required to
carry ethnic identity cards: and Rwandan Tutsis living in neighbouring
countries were routinely denied repatriation.'
In July 1990, internal and external pressure led President
Habyarimana to accept the multi-party system in principle. Before any
substantial changes took place, on 1 October 1990, an attack was launched
from Uganda by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)-comprised mainly
of Tutsi exiles demanding the resettlement of Tutsi refugees and the
overthrow of the Habyarimana regime.9 Despite the fact that troops loyal
to President Habyarimana repelled the invasion and killed the RPF leader,
Fred Rwigyema, sporadic fighting continued for the next three years. In
1993, the Rwandan Government, under pressure from the RPF, domestic
opposition, foreign donors and neighbouring countries, agreed to a
comprehensive peace agreement and a transition to democracy. The
agreements signed in the Tanzanian town of Arusha provided for power-
sharing in all governmental institutions and the repatriation of Tutsi
refugees under the supervision of 2,500 peacekeepers belonging to the
United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR)."'
Since they were opposed to the concept of power-sharing, Hutu hard-
liners in the Rwandan Government began to strengthen their power. In
March 1992, they formed the Coalition for the Defence of the Republic
(Coalition pour la d6fense de la republique or "CDR"). Extremist militia,
7. Id. at 19.
8. PRUNIER, supra note 4, at 75.
9. Mariann Meier Wang, The International Tribunal for Rwanda: Opportunities for
Clarification, Opportunities for Impact, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 177, 181 (1995).
10. See S.C. Res. 872, U.N. SCOR, 48 Sess., 3288' ' mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/872 (1993).
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known as the lnterahamwe ("those who work together"), were established,
trained and then deployed throughout the country." At the same time,
propaganda calling for the extermination of Tutsis and the assassination of
Hutu opposed to the Habyarimana regime began to be broadcast
throughout the country over the Radio des Milles Collines (RTLM) 2
These events led to an increase in extra-judicial killings, arrests and torture
of Tutsis and opposition Hutu.
With the situation in Rwanda worsening, on 6 April 1994, President
Habyarimana and other heads of State in the Great Lakes Region met in
the Tanzanian capital, Dar-es-Salaam, to discuss the implementation of the
Arusha peace accords. President Habyarimana never returned to Rwanda
alive. Within thirty minutes of his death, barricades were erected in Kigali
and the massacres began. The extremist militias along with the Presidential
Guard and the Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces Arm6es Rwandaises or
"FAR") first singled out moderate and opposition Hutu and then turned
their attention to the Tutsi population. 3 Among the first to die were a
number of Ministers in the coalition government, including its moderate
Hutu Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana. Ten Belgian peacekeepers,
who were trying to protect the Prime Minister, died alongside her.14 This
incident provoked the withdrawal of the Belgian contingent that formed
the core of UNAMIR. On 21 April 1994, the United Nations Security
Council announced the reduction of the peacekeeping force to 270
troops." Thousands of Rwandese who had sought protection at UNAMIR
bases were thus abandoned to their fate.
Although initially confined to the Rwandan capital, the massacres
soon spread to the countryside. Hundreds of thousands of Tutsis,
11. The Interahamwe was augmented by the Impuzamugambi ("those who have the same
goal"), which was established by the CDR. The members of Impuzamugambi "were
trained, armed and led by the Presidential Guard and other elements of the Rwandese
government army." Final Report of the Independent Commission of Experts established in
accordance with Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), 65, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405 (1994)
[hereinafter Final Report].
12. 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA 52 (1998).
13. Id. at 54.
14. Final Report, supra note 11, 68.
15. See S.C. Res. 912, U.N. SCOR, 49" Sess., 3368" mtg. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/912 (1994).
As the massacres continued, the United Nations reluctantly reversed its position on
peacekeepers. On 17 May 1994, the Security Council approved the upgrading of UNAMIR
to 5,500 persons and provided it with an expanded mandate to protect civilians and provide
security to humanitarian relief operations as well as an expanded right of self-defence
against threats to protected sites and populations. See S.C. Res. 918, U.N. SCOR, 491h Sess.,
3377" mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/918 (1994).
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sometimes encouraged or directed by local administrative officials, on the
promise of safety, gathered unsuspectingly in churches, schools, hospitals
and local government buildings where they were slaughtered, with the
victims' bodies being buried in mass graves or thrown in the rivers. 6
Furthermore, "tens of thousands of Tutsi women were .. raped... and/or
sexually mutilated.1 7
In the meantime, taking advantage of the constitutional vacuum that
now existed in Rwanda, Th6odore Sindikubwabo, speaker of the former
Parliament, created an interim Government and declared himself its
President." However, the death of President Habyarimana sparked a new
offensive by the RPF. On 8 April 1994, RPF troops stationed in Uganda
invaded Rwanda. Facing weak opposition, they soon entered the
Rwandan capital. Although the interim Government fled to Gitarama to
escape the intensification of the hostilities, battle for control of the capital
raged for a further two months." On 4 July 1994, the RPF captured Kigali,
forcing troops loyal to the interim Government to retreat to the western
regions of the country, near the border of Zaire. This did not stop the
killings, which continued unabated until 17 July 1994 when Gisenyi, the
last town in the hands of Government forces, fell to the RPF. A unilateral
cease-fire was declared immediately, and a new government headed by
President Pasteur Bizimungu and Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu,
both moderate Hutus, was installed.2'
III. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
A. Creation of the Tribunal
On 1 July 1994, the Security Council adopted resolution 935 (1994),
which reminded those involved in the conflict that "all persons who
commit or authorize the commission of serious violations of international
humanitarian law are individually responsible for those violations and
should be brought to justice."21 In addition, the resolution requested the
Secretary-General "to establish, an impartial Commission of Experts to
16. The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement 1110, Sept. 2, 1998.
17. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at 55.
18. See PRUNIER, supra note 4, at 232.
19. See id. at 268.
20. See id. at 300. The government of Bizimungu "committed itself to building a
multiparty democracy and to discontinuing the ethnic classification system" adopted by the
Habyarimana regime and utilised with genocidal effect by the interim Government.
Magnarella, supra note 4, at 424.
21. Lyal S. Sunga, The Commission of Experts on Rwanda and the Creation of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 16 HuM. RTS. L.J. 121, 121 (1995).
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examine and analyse.., evidence of grave violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda, including the
evidence of possible acts of genocide. 22
The Commission of Experts submitted an interim report to the
Secretary-General on 4 October 1994, - followed by a final report on 29
November 1994.24 In its interim report, the Commission concluded that the
conflict in Rwanda was, for the purposes of international humanitarian
law, an armed conflict of a non-international character. The obligations set
out in Article 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and in Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions and
relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts of
8 June 1977, therefore applied to the conflict. The legal norms prohibiting
crimes against humanity and genocide were also applicable. 2 On the basis
of the evidence they collected, the Commission concluded that individuals
on both sides of the conflict "had perpetrated serious breaches of
international humanitarian law.",2' Furthermore, overwhelming evidence
existed to prove that certain Hutu elements had carried out acts of
genocide against the Tutsi minority "in a concerted, planned, systematic
and methodical manner."' On the basis of these findings, the Commission
recommended that those individuals responsible for these crimes "be
brought to justice before an independent and impartial international
criminal tribunal.,
28
This recommendation was endorsed by the Secretary-General in a
report to the Security Council of 6 October 1994.29 Having determined that
the "genocide and other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of
international humanitarian law" committed in Rwanda "constitute a threat
to international peace and security," on the 8 November 1994, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 955 (1994) whereby it established a tribunal to
prosecute "persons responsible for committing genocide and other serious
22. Id. On 26 July 1994, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Amega Atsu-Koffi (Togo),
Ms. Haby Dieng (Guinea) and Mr. Salifou Fomba (Mali) to serve on the Commission. Id.
at 122.
23, Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission of Experts, 1$ 146-49, U.N. Doc.
S/1994/1125 (1994) [hereinafter Preliminary Report].
24. Final Report, supra note 11.
25. Sunga, supra note 21, at 122.
26. Preliminary Report, supra note 23, $ 146.
27. Id. 148.
28. Id. $ 150.
29. Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for
Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1133 (1994).
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violations of international humanitarian law" in Rwanda.3" The Statute of
the Tribunal was annexed to the Resolution.
B. The Statute
The Statute provided the Tribunal with jurisdiction over persons who
violated Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol II during the Rwandan conflict, as well as persons who committed
acts of genocide and crimes against humanity in the territory of Rwanda
and Rwandan citizens responsible for committing such acts in the territory
of neighbouring states, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994. :'
It further provided that the Tribunal would consist of three organs: the
Chambers, comprised of two Trial Chambers with three judges each and
an Appeals Chamber with five judges, the Prosecutor's office, and an
administrative Registry.32 In its report, the Commission of Experts
recommended that the jurisdiction of the Yugoslavia Tribunal be
expanded to include the crimes committed in Rwanda.: While the Security
Council did not follow this recommendation, it did not create a completely
separate tribunal either. Although it has separate Trial Chambers from the
Yugoslavia Tribunal, it shares the same Prosecutor, and the composition of
its Appeals Chamber is the same as that of the Yugoslavia Tribunal.
4
30. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49"s Sess., 3453d mtg. $ 1, U.N. Doe. S/RES/955 (1994).
The resolution was adopted by a vote of thirteen in favour to one against (Rwanda), with
one abstention (China). The Rwandan Government, which initially advocated the
establishment of the Tribunal, objected to the fact that the Tribunal would only have
jurisdiction over crimes committed in the 1994 calendar year and not, as they proposed,
between I October 1990, when the conflict began, and 17 July 1994. They were further
critical that the trials would be held outside Rwanda, that judges from certain States
involved in the conflict would be biased and that convicted persons would serve their
sentences outside Rwanda in countries offering prison facilities. Their final and principal
reason for opposition was that the maximum sentence proposed by the Statute, that is life
imprisonment, was too low. Since Rwandan law allowed for the death penalty, such a
penalty would in their opinion satisfy the demands in Rwanda for justice equal to the
gravity of genocide. Sunga, supra note 21, at 123. See also Magnarella, supra note 4, at 425.
31. "The rationale for this extension of territorial jurisdiction is that [various] Hutu militia
and government forces continued to kill and intimidate civilians after they fled in July
[19941 to refugee camps set up close to Rwanda's borders in [neighbouring States]." Jaana
Karhilo, The Establishment of the International Tribunalfor Rwanda, 64 NORDIC J. INT'L L.
683, 698 (1995).
32. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR,
49" Sess., 3453' mtg., Annex, art. 10, U.N. Doe. S/RES1955 (1994), reprinted in 33 LL.M.
1602 (1994).
33. Preliminary Report, supra note 23, S 152.
34. By providing for common key institutions, such as a common Prosecutor and a
common Appeals Chamber, the Security Council ensured that the interpretation and
2000]
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C. Initial Activities of the Tribunal
1. The Seat of the Tribunal
In Resolution 955 (1994), the Security Council decided that the seat of
the Tribunal would be determined by the Council "having regard to
considerations of justice and fairness as well as administrative efficiency,
including access to witnesses, and economy"' 5 and invited the Secretary-
General to submit recommendations as to its possible location. In a report
dated 13 February 1995, the Secretary-General, after taking into account
various political and practical factors, concluded that "the choice of
Rwanda as the location of the seat would not be feasible or appropriate"
and recommended that Arusha be selected as the seat of the Tribunal.36
The Security Council agreed, and issued a resolution to this effect on 22
February 1995. 77 A Headquarters Agreement between the United Nations
and Tanzania was duly signed,3 and after concluding a lease with the
management of Arusha International Conference Centre, the Tribunal
began operating out of its premises on 27 November 1995."9
2. The Election of the Judges and the Adoption of the Rules
Shortly after the adoption of Resolution 955 (1994), the Secretary-
General invited nominations from State Members of the United Nations,
as well as non-member States maintaining permanent observer missions at
United Nations Headquarters, for the Judges of the two Trial Chambers of
the Tribunal. Each candidate had to be of high moral character,
impartiality and integrity, and had to possess, in their respected country,
the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial office.
All nominations received by the Secretary-General were forwarded to the
application of international humanitarian law would be consistent between the Tribunal
and its counterpart in The Hague. Larry D. Johnson, The International Tribunal for
Rwanda, 67 INT'L REV. OF PENAL LAw 211,218 (1996).
35. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 30, 6.
36. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council
Resolution 955 (1994), J 35, U.N. Doc. S/1995/134. See also First Annual Report of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide
and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994
covering the period from 8 November 1994 to 30 June 1996, adopted at the Third Plenary
Session of the Tribunal, 2, U.N. Doc. A1511399-Sl19961778, Annex (1996) [hereinafter
First Annual Report].
37. First Annual Report, supra note 36, S 3. See S.C. Res. 977, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess.,
3502dmtg., U.N. Doc. S[RES/977 (1995).
38. First Annual Report, supra note 36, 4.
39. Id. $ 5.
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4',1Security Council, which-after drawing up a short list of twelve persons4-
transmitted the list of candidates to the President of the General Assembly
by letter dated 24 April 1995. After eight rounds of balloting on 24 and 25
May 1995, the General Assembly elected Lennart Aspegren (Sweden),
Laity Kama (Senegal), Tafazzal Hossain Khan (Bangladesh), Yakov A.
Ostrovsky (Russian Federation), Navanethem Pillay (South Africa) and
William Hussein Sekule (Tanzania) to serve on the two Trial Chambers."
Although the Secretary- General recognised the need for the judges to
be elected as soon as possible in order for the rules of procedure and
evidence of the Tribunal to be adopted, it was decided that they would
operate on an ad hoc, part-time basis until shortly before the
commencement of the trial proceedings to avoid the financial
consequences of them taking office too early.42 A special session of the
Tribunal was therefore convened for the sole purpose of adopting the
rules. Accordingly, between 26 and 29 June 1995, the six judges of the
Trial Chambers and the five judges of the Appeals Chamber held the first
plenary session of the Tribunal in The Hague, as its premises in Arusha
were not yet available. 3 In addition to adopting the rules, the judges
elected Judges Kama and Ostrovsky as President and Vice-President of
the Tribunal, respectively, 4 and established the composition of the two
Trial Chambers.
Over the course of the next six months it became evident that a
number of amendments would have to be made to the rules in order to
overcome practical problems uncovered during their implementation. Such
amendments were adopted at the Tribunal's second plenary session held in
Arusha between 8 and 12 January 1996. During the plenary, the judges
40. See S.C. Res. 989, U.N. SCOR, 50t Sess., 3524" mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/989 (1995).
41. First Annual Report, supra note 36, [ 7. The Statute of the ICTR was amended by the
Security Council in its Resolution 1165 of 30 April 1998 to provide for a third Trial
Chamber. Lloyd Williams of St. Kitts and Nevis, Dionysios Kondylis of Greece and Pavel
Dolenic of Slovenia were duly elected. On 22 February 1999 the three Judges took up their
positions. However, within one month of his appointment, Kondylis resigned and was
replaced by Asoka de Zoysa Gunawardena (Sri Lanka). Press Release, United Nations
Secretary-General Appoints New Judge to the Tribunal, U.N. Doe. ICTR'INFO-9-2-181
(Apr. 23, 1999).
The members of the Appeals Chamber at the time of writing were Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald (United States), Mohamed Shahabuddeen (Guyana), Lai Vohrah (Malaysia),
Tieya Wang (China) and Rafael Nieto-Navia (Colombia).
42. Karhilo, supra note 31, at 712.
43. Id.
44. Judges Kama and Ostrovsky were both reelected as President and Vice-President,
respectively, at the fourth plenary session of the Tribunal held in Arusha from 2 to 6 June
1997. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at 372-73.
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took the opportunity to promulgate two texts drawn up by the Registrar,
Mr. Andronico Adede (Kenya): the rules of detention and the directive for
the assignment of defence counsel.
4 5
3. The Appointment of the Deputy Prosecutor
Conscious of the support the Tribunal would need from the
Government of Rwanda and the deterrent effect that it would have, in
Resolution 955 (1994) the Security Council decreed that the Tribunal
establish an office in Rwanda itself.6 Accordingly, in January 1995, the
Tribunal opened an Investigative and Prosecutorial Unit in Kigali." Two
months later the Secretary-General appointed Honor6 Rakotomanana, a
retired chief justice from Madagascar, as Deputy Prosecutor to serve under
Richard Goldstone, who was elected Prosecutor of the Yugoslavia
Tribunal in July 1994.46
Following his appointment, the Deputy Prosecutor-who was
entrusted with overseeing the day-to-day running of the Kigali Office as
the Prosecutor was based in The Hague-set out to establish a functioning
Prosecutorial Office. His initial efforts in this regard were hindered by a
number of security concerns, 9 in particular, the lack of protection offered
to staff members stationed in Kigali and the inappropriate facilities
available to safeguard numerous documents passed to the Tribunal by the
Commission of Experts and other bodies of the United Nations °
Although such concerns were quickly resolved, the Deputy Prosecutor was
forced to spend much of the following year arranging for the recruitment
of key personnel and the establishment of the operational structures and
procedures necessary for the conduct of investigations. The delays in
45. First Annual Report, supra note 36, 28.
46. See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 30.
47. Karhilo, supra note 31, at 711.
48. U.N. Appoints Prosecutor for Rwandan Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1995, at A6. At
the start of 1996, Justice Goldstone announced he would leave the Tribunal as he wanted to
return to South Africa. On 29 February 1996, the Security Council, by Resolution 1047
(1996), appointed Justice Louise Arbour of Canada as the new Prosecutor of the Tribunal.
Justice Arbour took up her post when Justice Goldstone left the Tribunal on 1 October
1996. Barbara Crossette, 2 Tribunals on Atrocities will be led by Canadian, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 1996, at A7.
49. Karhilo, supra note 31, at 711.
50. As part of their functions, "a number of United Nations organs were in a position to
gather or receive information relating to the atrocities committed in Rwanda; notably the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur on Rwanda .... the Human
Rights Field Office in Rwanda, the United Nations peacekeeping operations established for
Rwanda and the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees." MORRIS
& ScHARF, supra note 12, at 433. See also Sunga, supra note 21, at 124.
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investigative and judicial activities were caused by the fact that the
Registrar was not appointed until September 1995, and that the initial
budget allocated to his office was inadequate for the tasks that needed to
be performed."
4. State Co-operation
Frustrated with the snail-like pace at which the Tribunal was
proceeding, many Rwandans became ambivalent towards the work of the
Tribunal5 -such ambivalence being highlighted by the mass execution of
twenty-two individuals found guilty of genocide by domestic courts in
Rwanda on 24 April 1998.53 Nevertheless, the support provided to the
Tribunal by the international community, as a whole, has remained high.
Due to a lack of enforcement mechanisms, the Tribunal is reliant on the
cooperation it receives from member States to give effect to its orders,
summonses, writs, warrants of arrest and transfer orders. Such cooperation
is vital considering that the majority of the leading perpetrators of the
genocide fled Rwanda to refugee camps in neighbouring countries or took
refuge in sympathetic States. 4 In January 1995, the leaders of Burundi,
Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia met in Nairobi, the
Kenyan capital, and agreed to transfer to the Tribunal those persons
responsible for carrying out the genocide.5 The following month, the
Security Council urged all States "to arrest and detain.., persons found in
their territory against whom there is sufficient evidence that they were
responsible for acts within the jurisdiction of the... Tribunal" and to
inform the Secretary-General and the Prosecutor of the details of such
cases." As a result, in the first four years of the Tribunal's existence, the
Governments of the African States of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the
Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, South Africa, Togo and Zambia have
all surrendered indicted persons to the Tribunal."' Indicted persons have
also been arrested in Belgium, Switzerland and the United States.
51. See Catherine Ciss6, The International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda: Some Elements of Comparison, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 114-15
(1997).
52. Id. at 115.
53. Kingsley Moghalu, A Shared Duty to Justice, LEGAL T1MES, Aug. 17, 1998, at 30.
54. Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and
Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT'L. L. 501,509 (1996).
55. Magnarella, supra note 4, at 438.
56. S.C. Res. 978, U.N. SCOR, 50" Sess., 3504'b mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/978 (1995).
57. It should be noted that even though the Kenyan authorities havc arrested twelve
indictees, they have not been completely co-operative. In October 1995, the Kenyan
President, Daniel Arap Moi, announced that not only would his country refuse to co-
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The Tribunal has also received assistance from the Rwandan
Government "in the transfer of detained witnesses to Arusha ... and.., in
the ... internal relocation of certain witnesses who feared for their safety
following their testimony."" Other States have issued special travel
documents to enable witnesses to appear before the Tribunal and return
safely to their place of residence. 9 Since it does not have its own prison
facilities, the Tribunal is reliant on the assistance of States for the
enforcement of its sentences. Although only the Government of Mali has
signed an agreement to this effect, the Tribunal is confident that a number
of other States will sign similar agreements shortly.&o
With regard to material assistance,
[t]he General Assembly, by its resolution 49/251 of 20 July 1995 invited
Member States and other interested parties to make voluntary
contributions to the Tribunal both in cash and [in] the form of services
and supplies acceptable to the Secretary-General. At the end of 1998,
cash contributions to the Voluntary Trust Fund to support the activities
of the [Tribunal] amounted to [approximately $7,500,000.00]....
These funds are used to supplement the regular budgetary funds of the
Tribunal for activities in strategic areas such as witness support,
investigations, and the transfer of detainees from the custody of various
countries to the United Nations Detention Facilities in Arusha.61
IV. THE INDICTMENTS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE TRIBUNAL
Despite the aforementioned difficulties, soon after the establishment
of the Tribunal, the Prosecutor compiled a list of four hundred suspects,
the majority being military and political leaders who had fled Rwanda
operate with the Tribunal, it would actively prevent the arrest of suspects and accused
residing therein. Although he subsequently retracted this statement, within months
President Moi, along with the leaders of Zaire and certain other African States, were
accused yet again of hindering the work of the Tribunal.
5& Third Annual Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens
Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of
Neighbouring States between I January and 31 December 1994, 146, U.N. Doc. A/53/429-
S/1998/857 (1998) [hereinafter Third Annual Report].
59. Id. 147.
60. Press Release, Cooperation and Assistance of States Key to Success of ICTR, U.N.




following the collapse of the Hutu regime.6' Using the list as a basis for his
investigations, the Prosecutor has been able to issue twenty-six public
indictments against forty-eight individuals; of whom thirty-eight are in
custody." These indictments can be divided into four areas: those against
the political leadership of Rwanda, the military leadership, individuals
associated with the media, and senior government administrators.
Accordingly, the investigative and the judicial activities of the Tribunal will
be examined under these headings.
A. Political Leaders
1. Kambanda
On 18 July 1997, at the initiative of the Prosecutor, an operation code-
named NAKI (Nairobi-Kigali) was carried out in which the Kenyan
authorities arrested and transferred to Arusha seven prominent officials
suspected of having participated in the genocide. Among the arrested was
Jean Kambanda, the former Prime Minister of the interim Government
and the highest ranking official indicted by the Tribunal to date' 4 During
his initial appearance on 1 May 1997, before Trial Chamber I, composed of
Judges Kama, Aspegren and Pillay, Kambanda pleaded guilty to
committing genocide and crimes against humanity. " By pleading guilty,
Kambanda acknowledged, inter alia, that as Prime Minister he "exercised
de jure authority and control over members of his government," as well as
"senior civil servants and senior officers in the military"; he participated in
the dismissal of Jean-Baptiste Habyalimana, the only prefect of Tutsi
origin, thus making possible the commencement of massacres of the Tutsi
population in the prefecture of Butare; between 8 April and 31 May 1994
he ordered the setting up of roadblocks with the knowledge that these
roadblocks were used to identify Tutsi and moderate Hutu to separate and
to eliminate them- and on or about 21 June 1994 he encouraged officials
62. "The investigation, which focuses on approximately 400 identified suspects, is being
conducted both in and outside Rwanda, notably in other African countries, Europe and
North America, where the principal planners of the crime of genocide are believed to be
located." Further Report of the Secretary-General on Practical Arrangements for the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 5, U.N. Doc. S/1995/533 (1995). See also
MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at 451.
63. To enable the arrest of the accused, a number of other indictments have been issued
subject to non-disclosure order. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at 484.
64. The Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-I, Indictment, Oct. 6, 1997.
65. The Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgement & Sentence 3,
Sept. 4, 1998.
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from "RTLM to continue inciting the massacres ... stating that this radio
station was 'an indispenable weapon in the fight against the enemy.
' 6
On 4 September 1998, Kambanda was sentenced to life imprisonment.
In its judgment the Trial Chamber took the position that the aggravating
circumstances surrounding the crimes committed by the accused far
outweighed any mitigating circumstances. 7 In particular, it felt that the
position he held within the interim Government at the time he committed
the said crimes ruled out any possibility of a lesser punishment." Three
days later, the defence filed a notice of appeal arguing, inter alia, that the
sentence imposed was excessive and no account had been taken of such
mitigating factors as his guilty plea and the co-operation he had provided
to the Prosecutor.69
2. Niyitegeka
On 15 July 1996, an indictment was confirmed against the Minister of
Information of the interim Government, Eliezer Niyitegeka.1 0 Allegedly
[a]t various locations and times throughout April, May and June 1994,
and often in concert with others, Eliezer Niyitegeka brought to the area
of Bisesero [in the Kibuye Prefecture] armed individuals and directed
them to attack the people seeking refuge there. In addition, at various
locations and times, and often in concert with others, Eliezer Niyitegeka
personally attacked and killed persons seeking refuge in Bisesero.
The accused was arrested on 9 February 1999 in Nairobi and was
transferred to Arusha two days later. On 15 April 1999, he entered a plea
of not guilty to the charges contained in the indictment.2
3. Ntagerura
On 10 August 1996, Andrd Ntagerura, Minister of Transport and
Communications and a prominent of the ruling party, the MRND, was
charged with six counts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war
66. Id. 39(ii)-(iv), (vii).
67. Id. 62.
68. Id. pt. IV.
69. The Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-A, Notice of Appeal, Sept. 7,
1998.
70. The Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-I, Indictment, July 15, 1996.
71. Press Release, Former Minister of Information Pleads Not Guilty to Six Counts on His




crimes for his role in the killing of an estimated 100,000 Tutsi civilians in
the Cyangugu prefecture between February and July 1994." Ntagerura-
who had been arrested in Cameroon in March 1996-was transferred to
the Tribunal on 23 January 1997 and is currently awaiting trial] 4
4. Nyiramasuhuko and Ntahobali
In May 1997, Judge Ostrovsky confirmed an indictment against
Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Minister of Family, Welfare and the
Advancement of Women in the Government of President Habyarimana
and in the interim Government, and her son Ars~ne Ntahobali, former
businessman, on charges of genocide and other violations of international
humanitarian law. 5 Ntahobali allegedly helped establish roadblocks used
"to identify, kidnap and kill members of the Tutsi population."' 6 He is also
accused of participating in the kidnapping and raping of several Tutsi
women." Nyiramasuhuko-the first woman to be indicted by an
international criminal court-was arrested as part of the NAKI operation
on 18 July 1997. Six days later, her son was also arrested by the Kenyan
authorities and transferred immediately to Arusha
5. Karemera et al.
On 7 April 1999, five senior officials of the interim Government
including two Ministers, Edouard Karemera, Minister of the Interior and
Vice-President of the MRND, and Andr6 Rwamakuba, Minister of
Education, pleaded not guilty to eleven counts jointly charging them with
committing various violations of international humanitarian law.' The five
73. It was alleged that, prior to the outbreak of the genocide, the accused authorised the
use of government vehicles for the transport of Interahamwe militia, as well as for the
transport of arms and ammunition to and throughout the prefecture of Cyangugu. The
Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-96-10A-I, Indictment, Aug. 10, 1996.
74. Second Annual Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens
Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of
Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994 covering the period from I
July 1996 to 30 June 1997, adopted on 6 June 1997, app. III, U.N. Doc. A/52/582-S/1997/868
(1997) [hereinafter Second Annual Report].
75. The Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko & Ntahobali, Case No. ICTR-97-21-I, Indictment,
May 29, 1997.
76. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at 490.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. The Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-I, Indictment, Aug. 28, 1998. Also
included in this indictment were Mathieu Ngirumpatse, former Director General for
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accused were "alleged to have conspired among themselves and with
others to work out a plan with the intent to exterminate the Tutsi
population and eliminate members of the opposition, so that they could
remain in power. ' 's In an extensive 108-page indictment, it was claimed
"that the components of this plan consisted of, among other things,
recourse to hatred and ethnic violence, the training of and distribution of
weapons to militiamen, as well as the preparation of lists of people to be
eliminated."81 The five accused were further alleged to have "organised,
ordered and participated in the massacres perpetrated against the Tutsi
population and moderate Hutu in Kigali, Butare, Gisenyi, Gitarama and
Cyangugu prefectures, and in Kibuye region. '"'
6. Bizimungu et al.
On 23 February 1999, Casimir Bizimungu, who served as the Minister
of Health in the interim Government, was transferred to Arusha after
being arrested in Nairobi." On 12 May 1999, Judge Pillay confirmed an
indictment against Bizimungu and three other Ministers-J~r6me
Bicamumpaka (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Prosper Mugiraneza
(Minister of the Civil Service) and Justin Mugenzi (Minister of Commerce
and Industry) who were arrested by the Cameroonian authorities the
previous month.8s The former ministers were jointly charged with
committing genocide, complicity in genocide and crimes against humanity.
B. Military Leaders
1. Bagosora
On 17 May 1996, Trial Chamber I granted the Prosecutor's proposal
to address a formal request to the Belgian authorities to defer to the
competence of the Tribunal the investigations and proceedings instituted
Foreign Affairs in the President's Office, Joseph Nzirorera, former Speaker of Parliament
and Juvenal Kajelijeli, former Bourgmestre of Mukingo commune in the prefecture of
Ruhengeri. Two other individuals were included in the indictment; however, their
identities have yet to be revealed by the Tribunal.
The five accused were arrested in various African countries in late 1998: Karemera in
Togo, Ngirumpatse in Mali, Nzirorera and Kajelijeli in Benin, and Rwamakuba in Namibia.
JOHN R.W.D. JONES, THE PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA 30 (2d ed. 2000).
80. Press Release, Five Senior Officials of the 1994 Interim Government of Rwanda Plead
Not Guilty to Eleven Counts, U.N. Doc. ICTR/INFO-9-2-177 (Apr. 7, 1999).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Press Release, Casimir Bizimungu, Former Rwandan Foreign Minister, Transferred to
Arusha, U.N. Doc. ICTR/INFO-9-2-167 (Feb. 23, 1999).
84. The Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, Case No. ICTR-99-50-I, Indictment, May 12, 1999.
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by the Belgian courts in respect of Th6oneste Bagosora, former Directeur
de Cabinet of the Ministry of Defence." On the same day, Judge
Aspegren issued an order requesting the Government of Cameroon to
transfer Bagosora, who had been arrested in the country two months
earlier, to the Tribunal's custody."
Before the necessary formalities could be completed, the Prosecutor
submitted an indictment against Bagosora, which was confirmed by Judge
Aspegren on 18 August 1996."7 According to the indictment, the accused,
who allegedly assumed official and de facto control of military and political
affairs in Rwanda following the death of President Habyarimana, was
responsible, by his acts or omissions, for the killing and serious injuring of
an incalculable number of Tutsi men, women and children, as well as the
murder of ten Belgian soldiers serving with UNAMIR." In January 1997,
the President of Cameroon, Paul Biya, authorised the transfer of Bagosora
to the Tribunal." On 7 March 1997, the accused pleaded not guilty to the
charges contained in the indictment.
2. Nsengiyumva
On 12 July 1996, the Tribunal indicted Anatole Nsengiyumva, former
Lieutenant-Colonel in FAR who served as commander of military opera-
tions in the Gisenyi prefecture at the time of the genocidei0 It was alleged
that, on the night of 6 to 7 April 1994, "Nsengiyumva presided over a
meeting in Gisenyi prefecture, during which he ordered the participants to
organise the killing of [the local Tutsi population]."9' Furthermore,
between April and June 1994, the accused "presided over meetings of
several hundred [Interahamwe] militia in the Umuganda Stadium in
Gisenyi prefecture, where he urged those in attendance to [continue the
killings].'.q Nsengiyumva, who had been arrested three months earlier in
Cameroon at the request of the Prosecutor, was transferred to Arusha on
23 January 1997.3 He is currently awaiting trial.
85. The Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-96-7-D, Decision of the Trial Chamber
on the Application by the Prosecutor for a Formal Request for Deferral to the Competence
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the Matter of Theoneste Bagosora
(Pursuant to Rules 9 and 10 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence), May 17, 1996.
86. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at 489 n.1641.
87. The Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-96-7-I, Indictment, Aug. 18, 1996.
88. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at 489.
89. Id.
90. The Prosecutor v. Nsengiyumva, Case No. ICTR-96-12-I, Indictment, July 12, 1996.
91. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at 488 n.1634.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 488.
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3. Kabiligi and Ntabakuze
On 18 July 1997, Gratien Kabiligi, former Brigadier-General in the
General Staff of FAR, and Aloys Ntabakuze, Commander of the Para-
Commando Battalion, FAR, were arrested as part of the NAKI operation
and were transferred to Arusha where they were detained as suspects
pursuant to Rule 40 bis.94 After their provisional detention had been
extended twice, Judge Aspegran confirmed an indictment against Kabiligi
and Ntabakuze on 15 October 1997." The accused allegedly "planned,
incited to commit, ordered committed or in some other way aided and
abetted the planning preparation or execution of the said acts" and "knew
or had reason to know that their subordinates were preparing to commit or
had committed the said acts and failed to take the necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent them from being committed or punish
those responsible."96 By advocating the elimination of the Tutsis "within a
short period of time," Kabiligi was also alleged to have "incited the
Interahamwe militiamen to murder Tutsi civilians."'' Ntabakuze was
similarly accused of making anti-Tutsi statements and was alleged to have
"ordered his subordinates to avenge the death of President Habyarimana
by killing the [Tutsi population]."'98
4. Nteziryayo and Nsabimana
On 16 October 1997, Colonel Alphonse Nteziryayo, former
Commanding Officer of the Military Police and prefect of Butare from
21 June 1994 onwards, and Sylvain Nsabimana, whom he replaced as
prefect, were jointly charged with committing genocide and other
violations of international humanitarian law.99 According to the
indictment, the accused incited the population of Buture to massacre
Tustis living in the prefecture. Nsabimana, who was apprehended as part
of the NAKI operation, pleaded not guilty to the charges against him on
24 October 1997.1°° Nteziryayo entered a similar plea on 17 August 1998
after being arrested in Burkina Faso. 1
94. Second Annual Report, supra note 74, app. V, 9.
95. The Prosecutor v. Kabiligi & Ntabakuze, Case No. ICTR-97-34-I, Indictment, Oct. 15,
1997.
96. Id.
97. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at 491.
98. Id.
99. The Prosecutor v. Nteziryayo & Nsabimana, Case No. ICTR-97-29-1, Indictment, Oct.
16, 1997.
100. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at 492.
101. Press Release, Colonel Alphonse Nteziryayo Pleads 'Not Guilty' to Six Counts During




On 10 July 1998, Major Bernard Ntuyahaga-Officer in Charge of
Logistics at the Kigali Military Camp from January to April 1994-
surrendered himself voluntarily to the custody of the Tribunal.""
Ntuyahaga was suspected of being criminally responsible for the murder of
the then Prime Minister of Rwanda, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, and ten
Belgian soldiers who were members of UNAMIR. The accused was
subsequently indicted on a single count of crime against humanity
(murder), 3 and on 13 November 1998 he pleaded not guilty to said
count.""
However, before the trial on the merits could commence, in February
1999, the Prosecutor sought leave to withdraw the indictment against the
accused. The Prosecutor argued, inter alia, that the withdrawal would
promote the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by Belgium, which had
instituted criminal investigations against the accused. "" On 18 March 1999,
Trial Chamber I granted the request of the Prosecutor."" Since the
withdrawal of the indictment was tantamount to a termination of
proceedings, the Trial Chamber also ordered the immediate and
unconditional release of the accused; thereby rejecting the Prosecutor's
request to have the accused turned over to the Tanzanian authorities."
6. Serushago
On 9 June 1998, Omar Serushago, former businessman and local
leader of the Interahamwe militia in the Gisenyi prefecture, voluntarily
102. Press Release, Another Suspect Surrenders Voluntarily, U.N. Doc. ICTRJINFO-9-2-
131 (July 11, 1998).
103. The Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga, Case No. ICTR-98-40-I, Indictment, Sept. 29, 1998.
104. Press Release, Major Bernard Ntuyahaga Pleads Not Guilty to the Murder of Belgian
Soldiers and the Former Rwandan Prime Minister, U.N. Doc. ICTRJINFO-9-2-151 (Nov. 13,
1998).
105. ICTR Update, Prosecution Seeks to Withdraw Indictment Against Bernard Ntuyahaga,
a Former Major in the Rwanda Armed Forces, Belgium Seeks to Prosecute Him, U.N. Doc.
ICTRIUPD-013 (Mar. 16, 1999).
106. The Prosecutor also argued that prosecuting the accused on a single count indictment
would not fit into the Prosecution's strategy of showing the genocide as a conspiracy. The
Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga, Case No. ICTR-98-40-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion to
Withdraw the Indictment, Mar. 18, 1999.
107. Id. Within days of being released from the United Nations Detention Facilities,
Ntuyahaga was arrested by the Tanzanian authorities. A request to have Ntuyahaga
extradited to Belgium was subsequently rejected on the grounds that the extradition treaty
between the two countries did not allow extradition to a country other than where the
alleged crimes were committed. At the time of writing, an extradition request from the
Government of Rwanda is under review. See JONES, supra note 79, at 34-35.
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surrendered to the authorities of the Ivory Coast.' °" On 24 September
1998, the Prosecutor submitted for confirmation an indictment against
Serushago, which was confirmed by Judge Ostrovsky five days later.'° On
14 December 1998, during his initial appearance before Trial Chamber I,
the accused pleaded guilty to four counts of genocide and crimes against
humanity (murder, extermination and torture), and not guilty to a fifth
count of crimes against humanity (rape). The fifth count was then
withdrawn by the Prosecutor with the leave of the Trial Chamber. After
taking into account the substantial cooperation he had provided to the
Prosecutor, his voluntary surrender and guilty plea, his family and social
background, the assistance he gave to certain potential Tutsi victims during
the genocide, and his expression of remorse and contrition, the Trial
Chamber decided to mitigate his punishment, and accordingly sentenced
him to fifteen years imprisonment. °"0 The accused has subsequently filed
an appeal against the sentence.'
C. Media Leaders
1. Nahimana
At the start of 1996, the Prosecutor became aware that the Belgian
authorities were investigating those persons in charge of the station RTLM
for helping incite the genocide by broadcasting messages designed to
inflame inter-ethnic hatred and to encourage the Hutu population to kill
and commit acts of violence and persecution against the Tutsi population
and others on political grounds. Since his office was conducting its own
investigations on the involvement of such individuals in the genocide, in
March 1996 the Prosecutor sought an order requesting Belgium to defer its
investigations to the Tribunal's competence. 2 The request was granted,'13
and as a consequence of the Prosecutor's investigations, on 12 July 1996 an
indictment was confirmed against the most senior official of the radio
108. The Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence, Feb. 5, 1999.
109. The Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-I, Indictment, Sept. 29,1998.
110. The Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence, Feb. 5, 1999.
111. The Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-A, Notice of Appeal, Mar. 11,
1999.
112. In the Matter of Case No. ICTR-96-6-D, In the Matter of an Application by the
Prosecutor for a Formal Request for Deferral by the Kingdom of Belgium and In the
Matter of Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines Sarl, Mar. 10, 1996.
113. In the Matter of Case No. ICTR-96-6-D, Decision of the Trial Chamber on the
Application by the Prosecutor for a Formal Request for Deferral to the Competence of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the Matter of Radio Television Libre des




station, Ferdinand Nahimana, on charges of conspiracy to commit
genocide, incitement to commit genocide and complicity in the
commitment of genocide.' The accused, who had been arrested in
Cameroon in March 1996, was transferred to Arusha on 23 January 1997.
At his initial appearance he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him
and is currently in custody awaiting trial."'
2. Ngeze
On 3 October 1997, Judge Aspegren confirmed an indictment against
Hassan Ngeze-founder and editor-in-chief of the Rwandan newspaper,
Kangura-who was arrested as part of the NAKI operation. " ' According
to the indictment, Ngeze knowingly, with his consent and direction,
published or allowed to be published in Kangura certain materials used in
the preparation of the genocide against the Tutsi population of Rwanda.
At his initial appearance on 19 November 1997, Ngeze pleaded not guilty
to the charges against him."7
3. Ruggiu
The seventh and last individual apprehended as part of the NAKI
operation was Georges Ruggiu, a Belgian journalist and the only non-
Rwandan to be accused by the Tribunal to date. Ruggiu-who was
indicted on 9 October 1997 on charges of direct and public incitement to
commit genocide and crimes against humanity"8-- allegedly "made
broadcasts over RTLM in which he incited [the Hutu population] to kill
and/or cause bodily and/or mental harm to Tutsis.""9
4. Barayagwiza
On 23 October 1997, Judge Aspegren confirmed an indictment against
Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, former Director of Political Affairs in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, member of the Cornite d'lnitiative of RTLM
and senior officer in the administration of its Kigali radio station.
12
According to the indictment, the accused "presided over several meetings
to plan the killings of Tutsis and certain Hutus, distributed weapons and
money [to Interahamwe militia] and instigated and ordered killings and
114. The Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-96-11-I, Indictment, July 12, 1996.
115. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at 488.
116. The Prosecutor v. Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-97-27-I, Indictment, Oct. 3, 1997.
117. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at 490.
118. The Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Indictment, Oct. 9, 1997.
119. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at 490.
120. The Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-I, Indictment, Oct. 23, 1997.
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acts of violence against [the Tutsi population]." ' Barayagwiza was
arrested in Cameroon on 27 March 1996 and transferred to the Tribunal
on 19 November 1997.122
D. Senior Government Administrators
1. Nsabimana et al.
On 22 November 1995, the Prosecutor submitted for confirmation the
first indictment in which eight persons-Cldment Kayishema, Obed
Ruzindana, Ignace Bagilishema, Charles Sikubwabo, Aloys Ndimabati,
Vincent Rutaganira, Mikaeli Muhimana and Ryandikayo-were accused
of having perpetrated various violations of international humanitarian law
in connection with massacres alleged to have been committed at four
locations in the prefecture of Kibuye during the summer of 1994.123 The
indictment was confirmed on 28 November 1995 by Judge Pillay, who also
issued warrants for the arrest of each of the accused.24 Three of the eight
individuals who are the subject of this indictment have been arrested.
In May 1996, Kayishema, former prefect of Kibuye, was arrested by
the Zambian authorities and transferred to Arusha. Four months later,
Ruzindana, former businessman in Kibuye during the 1994 genocide, was
arrested in Kenya.'2' On 6 November 1996, Trial Chamber II, comprising
Judges Sekule, Khan and Ostrovsky, decided to join the cases against the
accused in order to try them together and set the date for start of the trial
on 20 February 1997.126 However, as the Tribunal only had one courtroom
121. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at 492.
122. See id.
123. The Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-I, Indictment, Nov. 28 1995. The
first massacre site addressed in the indictment is the Catholic Church and St. John Home
complex which is located in Kibuye town, Gitesi commune. According to the indictment,
on or about 17 April 1994, thousands of men, women and children were massacred at this
site. The second massacre site is the Stadium, which is also located in Kibuye town. At this
location, on or about 18 and 19 April 1994, thousands of men, women and children were
massacred. In addition, hundreds of men, women and children were injured. The third
massacre site is the Church in Mubuga, which is located in the Gishyita commune.
Between 14 and 17 April 1994, thousands of men, women and children were killed at this
site and hundreds injured. The fourth and final massacre site is located in the area of
Bisesero which extends through two communes in the Kibuye Prefecture: Gishyita and
Gisovu. According to the indictment, from 10 April until 30 June 1994 attacks occurred
almost on a daily basis in this area with a result that thousands of men, women and children
were killed and numerous others injured. Id. See also MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at
484-85.
124. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at 485.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 518. On 10 April 1997, the Trial Chamber rejected a motion of the Prosecutor
proposing a new superceding indictment severing the two accused from their six co-
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available at the time and in order to provide the defence with extra time to
prepare the case, the Chamber postponed the start of the trial to 9 April
1997. Some nineteen months later, the trial came to a close. In addition to
expert witnesses and other witnesses who had served as investigators in the
Office of the Prosecutor, fifty-one witnesses from Rwanda testified for the
prosecution." 7 Twenty-eight witnesses appeared for the defence.'>
On 21 May 1999, the Trial Chamber convicted Kayishema of four
counts of genocide-one for each of the mass-killing sites in the Kibuye
prefecture-and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The Chamber found
that as prefect, the accused not only ordered the massacres of tens of
thousands of Tutsis hiding in churches and schools in the area, but also
personally incited killers and sometimes fired the initial shot. 29 Ruzindana
was convicted for participating in the massacres of Tutsis hiding in the
wilderness of Bisesero and was sentenced to twenty-five years
imprisonment. The Chamber held that he had used his position as a
wealthy businessman to reward Interahamwe militia with money and
alcohol and had helped transport them to the massacre sites."'
Departing from the Tribunal's earlier judgements, in particular the
Akayesu judgement, infra, the Trial Chamber dismissed several additional
counts of crimes against humanity (murder and extermination) on the
grounds that these offences are subsumed fully by the counts of
genocide.' Further counts of crimes against humanity (other inhumane
acts) were set aside as vague,32 and war crimes allegations were dismissed
as the Prosecutor had failed to demonstrate a direct link between the
crimes committed by the accused and the armed conflict that was waging
in Rwanda at the time. 1
33
On 20 February 1999, a third individual accused in the Kibuye
indictment, Ignace Bagilishema, former bourgmestre of Mabanza
commune in the Kibuye prefecture, was arrested by South African
accused. Id.
127. The Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement § 1.4,
21, May 21, 1999.
128. Id. § 1.4, SJ 23.
129. Id. § 6.2, 1 551-69.
130. Id. § 6.2, [ 570-71.
131. Id. § 6.3, 577. The Trial Chamber held that "[a]ll counts for these crimes are based
on the same facts and the same criminal conduct. These crimes were committed at the
same massacre sites, against the same people, belonging to the Tutsi ethnic group with the
same intent to destroy this group in whole or in part." Id.
132 Id. § 6.3, 584.
133. The Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement § 6.4,
623, May 21, 1999.
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authorities and transferred to Arusha. On 1 April 1999, the accused
pleaded not guilty to the charges against him."
2. Rutaganda
In the first of two indictments confirmed by Judge Sekule on 16
February 1996, Georges Rutaganda, former businessman and Vice-
President of the Interahamwe, was charged with organising and
participating in massacres committed in April 1994 in the prefectures of
Kigali and in the Masango commune in the Gitarama prefecture.'
Rutaganda, who had been arrested in Zambia on 19 October 1995, was
transferred to the custody of the Tribunal on 26 May 1996.136 Although his
initial appearance was held four days later-in which he entered not guilty
pleas to each of the charges against him-Trial Chamber I did not begin to
hear evidence against Rutaganda until 18 March 1997. After several
postponements due to the ill health of the accused,'37 the Prosecution
closed its case on 29 May 1998. At the time of writing, the presentation of
evidence on behalf of the defence is still on-going.
3. Akayesu
In the second of the indictments confirmed by Judge Sekule on 16
February 1996, Jean-Paul Akayesu, former bourgmestre of the commune
of Taba in the prefecture of Gitarama, was accused of being responsible
for the killings of at least 2,000 Tutsis, including the direct ordering of the
killing of eight detained men by a militia armed with clubs, machetes and
other traditional weapons. 3 ' Akayesu, who had been arrested by the
Zambian authorities at the same time as Rutaganda, accompanied his
fellow accused to Arusha on 26 May 1996.139
On 29 May 1996, Akayesu appeared before Trial Chamber I and
pleaded not guilty to all the charges contained in the indictment. During
the next few months, a number of interlocutory decisions were rendered
134. Press Release, Indictee Bagilishema Surrenders to the ICTR in South Africa, is
Transferred to Arusha, U.N. Doc. ICTR/INFO-9-2-165 (Feb. 22, 1999).
135. The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-I, Indictment, Feb. 16, 1996.
136. Press Release, Georges Rutaganda Begins Testimony in his own Defence, U.N. Doc.
ICTRIINFO-9-2-177 (Apr. 7, 1999).
137. On 25 September 1996, Trial Chamber I rejected a motion for the provisional release
of the accused on the grounds of ill health since Rutaganda was receiving appropriate
medical treatment at the civilian hospital near the United Nations Detention Facilities.
The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-PT, Decision on the Request Submitted
by the Defence, Sept. 25, 1996.
138. The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-I, Indictment, Feb. 16, 1996.
139. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at 486.
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including two orders relating to witnesses who were scheduled to testify in
the case. On 27 September 1996, the Chamber ordered that pseudonyms
be given to certain prosecution witnesses and restrictions be placed on the
sketching, photographing and audio-visual recording of such persons. '  In
the second ruling, issued on 2 October 1996, the Chamber ordered that a
witness, who was at the time being detained in Rwanda, be transferred
temporarily to the Tribunal's Detention Facilities in Arusha. '
On 9 January 1997, the first trial of the Tribunal commenced. After
several witnesses had appeared, the Chamber permitted the Prosecutor to
amend the indictment against Akayesu to include three counts of sexual
violence.42 Since the accused pleaded not guilty to these charges, the
Prosecutor then presented evidence in support of the additional
allegations. In all, the Prosecutor called twenty-eight witnesses. Thirteen
witnesses, including the accused and Major-General Romero Dallaire,"3
former force Commander of UNAMIR whose immunity had been
partially lifted by the United Nations Secretary-General, appeared for the
defence. A total of 155 exhibits were submitted during the trial. After
hearing closing arguments, the Chamber began its deliberations on 28
March 1998, fifteen months after the commencement of the trial.
41
On 2 September 1998, Trial Chamber I found Akayesu guilty of
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide and crimes
against humanity (extermination, murder, torture, rape and other
inhumane acts) and acquitted him of charges of complicity in genocide and
war crimes '45 In the first pronouncement on the concept of genocide by an
international tribunal, the Chamber held that there had been an intention
amongst both the military and political leadership of the Hutu population
to eliminate the Tutsis. In his capacity as bourgmestre, Akayesu was
responsible for maintaining law and public order in the Taba commune.
Although he initially tried to prevent the killings, after 18 April 1994 he
not only stopped trying to maintain law and order but was also present
during the killings and sometimes gave orders for bodily and mental harm
to be caused to certain Tutsis, and endorsed and even ordered the killing
of several Tutsi.1 In particular, on 19 April 1994 Akayesu addressed a
140. Second Annual Report, supra note 74, T 13.
141. Id. 14.
142. Id. 12.
143. The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Decision on the Motion to
Subpoena a Witness, Nov. 19, 1997. See also MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at 444-45.
144. Third Annual Report, supra note 58, T 19.
145. The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, Sept. 2, 1998.
146. Id. T 704.
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public gathering in Taba urging those present to unite and eliminate the
Inkotanyi, a derogatory term used to refer to Tutsi.147
The Chamber also found that numerous Tutsi women, who had
sought refuge at the Taba communal office to escape the massacres, were
systematically raped and subjected to multiple acts of sexual violence by
armed Hutu militia."' Akayesu was found to have encouraged these acts
by his attitude and utterances. On one occasion, the accused was purported
to have said to the lnterahamwe militia who were raping female victims,
"never ask me again what a Tutsi women tastes like. 1 49
With respect to the charges of violations of Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II, the Chamber found
that-although these provisions were applicable to the Rwandan conflict-
the Prosecutor had failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that
Akayesu was a member of the armed forces and that he had the authority
to support and carry out the war effort.1°
On 2 October 1998, Trial Chamber I sentenced Jean-Paul Akayesu to
life imprisonment."' The Prosecutor and the accused have both lodged
appeals against the decision.152
4. Ndayambaje
On 10 January 1996, Trial Chamber II heard a Prosecution proposal
147. The Chamber defined the crime of direct and public incitement to genocide mainly on
the basis of Article 19 of the Rwandan Penal Code, as directly provoking another to
commit genocide through speeches at public gatherings or through the sale or
dissemination of written or audio-visual communication, and considered the crime to have
been committed whether or not such public incitement was successful. Id. 9 549-62.
148. Id. T 706. Since there was no commonly accepted definition of the crime of rape in
international law, the Chamber defined it as "a physical invasion of a sexual nature,
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive." Id. 688. Sexual
violence, including rape, "is not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may
include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact." Id. It noted that
coercive circumstance did not need to be evidenced by a show of physical force. "Threats,
intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation could
be coercion." Id.
149. Id. T 706.
150. Id. 9 643.
151. The Trial Chamber found that although Akayesu was not a high official in the
Government, his position as bourgmestre made him the highest Governmental authority in
the Taba commune and as such he was entrusted with the protection of the population. He
betrayed this trust by not only participating in the killings but also by inciting the Hutu
population to murder Tutsis. The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,
Sentence, Oct. 2, 1998.
152. Press Release, The Jean-Paul Akayesu Case: Parties Appeal, U.N. Doc. ICTR/INFO-
9-2-144 (Oct. 7, 1998).
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for deferral in respect of three persons who had been detained by the
Belgian authorities: Elie Ndayambaje, Joseph Kanyabashi and Alphonse
Higaniro. The Chamber approved the Prosecutor's request and asked the
Belgian authorities to defer their investigations and proceedings to the
Tribunal's competence.'5
On 20 June 1996, Ndayambaje, former bourgmestre of Muganza
commune in the Butare prefecture, was indicted on charges of genocide,
crimes against humanity and serious violations of Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II. '  It was alleged that the
accused along with the communal police, the gendarmarie, soldiers and
armed civilians, murdered and injured large numbers of Tutsi refugees in
Kibuye in April 1994.15" Ndayambaje was transferred to the Tribunal on 8
November 1996 where he is currently awaiting trial."6
5. Ntaganzwa
On 21 June 1996, Judge Khan confirmed an indictment against
Ladislas Ntaganzwa, former bourgmestre of Nyakizu commune in the
prefecture of Butare. 7 In addition to being accused of giving speeches
encouraging the elimination of all Tutsi from the commune, Ntaganzwa
was charged with ordering and personally participating in the killing and
injuring of Tutsis who sought refuge in the Cyahinda parish complex.'
The accused is still at large.
6. Ntakirutimana et al.
On 10 August 1996, the Tribunal issued an indictment against four
individuals who allegedly organised and led an attack on 16 April 1994 on
the Seventh Day Adventist Church in Mugonero, Kibuye prefecture,
which resulted in the death of hundreds of unarmed Tutsi civilians who
153. In the Matter of Case No. ICTR-96-2-D, Decision of the Trial Chamber on the
Application by the Prosecutor for a Formal Request for Deferral to the Competence of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the Matter of Elic Ndayambaje, Joseph
Kanyabashi and Alphonse Higaniro (Pursuant to Rules 9 and 10 of the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence), Jan. 11, 1996. While Ndayambaje and Kanyabashi were subsequently
indicted, the Tribunal decided not to pursue the prosecution of Higaniro. MORRIS &
SCHARF, supra note 12, at 322-23.
154. The Prosecutor v. Ndayambaje, Case No. ICTR-96-8-I, Indictment 4, June 20, 1996.
155. Id. T 8.
156. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at 487.
157. The Prosecutor v. Ntaganzwa, Case No. ICTR-96-9-I, Indictment, June 21, 1996.
158. It is estimated that over 5,800 Tutsi who had taken refuge in the church in Cyahinda
were massacred. Only 200 people survived the killings. Final Report, supra note 11, 9 88.
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had gathered there. '59 Two of the four accused, Obed Ruzindana and
Charles Sikubwabo, had been previously accused of organising other
massacres in the Kibuye prefecture. G6rard Ntakirutimana, a physician at
the church, was arrested in the Ivory Coast in October 1996 and was
transferred to Arusha the following month.' 6° His father, Elizaphan
Ntakirutimana, the Pastor of the Church at the time of the events in
question, was arrested in the United States on 29 September 1996, at the
request of the Tribunal. 1 ' However, on 17 December 1997, United States
magistrate M.C. Notzon denied the request for the transfer of the accused
and ordered the immediate release of Ntakirutimana on two grounds:'62 the
manner in which the United States had implemented its obligations under
the Statute of the Tribunal was unconstitutional,"63 and the information
supporting the request did not rise to the level of probable cause.'6
Two months later Ntakirutimana was rearrested, and on 5 August
1998 Judge John Rainey "rectified" the ruling of his colleague. The Judge
deemed that such a transfer was constitutionally valid and that the
evidence presented was sufficient.5" Despite his ruling, at the time of
writing Ntakirutimana has not been transferred to Arusha.
On 7 September 1996, Elizaphan and Grrard Ntakirutimana were
further indicted for leading armed bands of men into the countryside of
the Bisesero region of Rwanda in an effort to hunt down and kill those
Tusti who had survived the attack at Mugonero. 6
7. Musema
On 12 March 1996, the Tribunal addressed a request to the Swiss
159. The Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-10-I, Indictment, Aug. 10, 1996.
160. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at 487.
161. Id.
162. See In re Surrender of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, 988 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
163. Id. The Judge held that executive agreement with the Tribunal was effected by
Congress through enacting enabling legislation rather than through a traditional ratification
process by the Senate, as provided for in Article 11, Section 2 of the Constitution of the
United States. Goran Sluiter, To Cooperate or not Cooperate?: The Case of the Failed
Transfer of Ntakirutimana to the Rwanda Tribunal, 11 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 383, 389 (1998).
164. Id. at 391. The Judge found that the evidence against Ntakirutimana did not rise to
the level of probable cause as the accusation was based on twelve unidentified witnesses
whose credibility was not supported and whose testimony was taken by a Belgian police
officer assigned to the Tribunal, who could not speak the Kinyarwanda language, in
unspecified conditions and without them knowing that they were testifying under oath.
165. Moghalu, supra note 53, at 29; see also Jordan J. Paust, The Freeing of Ntakirutimana
in the United States and 'Extradition' to the ICTR, 1 Y.B. OF INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 205,
209 (1998).
166. The Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-17-I, Indictment, Sept. 7, 1996.
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authorities asking them to defer to its competcnce their investigations and
prosecution of Alfred Musema, the Director of the Gisovu Tea Factory in
the prefecture of Kibuye, who had been detained by the Swiss authorities
in February the previous year. ' 7 On 12 July 1996, Musema was charged
with responsibility for, and the direct participation in, the killings of
thousands of Tutsi men, women and children between April and June 1994
in the area of Bisesero in the Kibuye prefecture.' The accused was
transferred to Arusha on 20 May 1997, and during his initial appearance on
18 November 1997 he pleaded not guilty to all the counts against him."
The trial on the merits of Musema opened on 25 January 1999 before
Trial Chamber I. In her opening statement, the lead prosecutor, Jane
Adong, stated that the accused used his position at the factory to lead
attacks against Tutsis taking refuge in the hills nearby. "The Tutsis were
attacked on a daily basis for three months. It was relentless. It was
thorough. It was bloody."'7" After five witnesses had testified that the
accused had raped Tutsi women during attacks and had encouraged
members of the extremist militias to engage in acts of sexual torture, on
29 April 1999 the Prosecutor filed an amended indictment to include three
additional counts of rape. 7' On 6 May 1999, Musema pleaded not guilty to
these charges. The trial is expected to conclude towards the end of July
1999.
8. Kanyabashi
On 15 July 1996, Judge Ostrovsky confirmed an indictment against
Joseph Kanyabashi, former bourgmestre of Ngoma commune in the
prefecture of Butare, on various counts of genocide and other violations of
international law.72 According to the indictment, in addition to facilitating
and inciting the widespread killings of Tustis in his commune, the accused
167. The Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-5-D, Decision of the Trial Chamber on
the Application by the Prosecutor for a Formal Request for Deferral to the Competence of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the Matter of Alfred Muscma (Pursuant
to Rules 9 and 10 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence), Mar. 12, 1996.
168. The Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-I, Indictment, July 12, 1996. It was
alleged that the accused, at various locations and times throughout April, May and June
1994, and often in concert with others, brought to the area of Bisesero in Kibuye prefecture
armed individuals and directed them to attack Tutsi people seeking refuge there from
attacks and killings that began in Rwanda soon after the plane transporting President
Habyarimana crashed. Id. See JONES, supra note 79, at 29.
169. MORRIS & SCHtARF, supra note 12, at 489.
170. The Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Transcript of Hearing, Jan. 25,
1999.
171. Press Briefing, Musema Trial, U.N. Doc. ICTR/INFO-9-13-001 (May 8,1999).
172. The Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15-I, Indictment, July 15, 1996.
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participated in the removal and subsequent massacre of Tutsis from the
University of Butare Hospital.'71 Following his transfer to Arusha, on 29
November 1996 Kanyabashi was brought before Trial Chamber II and
asked to plead guilty or not guilty to the five counts of the indictment."'
The accused declined to enter a plea,' arguing that he was insufficiently
represented by counsel. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber registered a plea
of not guilty to all the counts on his behalf."'
On 17 April 1997, the defence filed a pre-trial motion challenging the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal on five grounds. The defence contended that
the establishment of the Tribunal violated the sovereignty of States,
particularly Rwanda, because it had not been created by means of an
international treaty upon the recommendation of the General Assembly;
the Security Council lacked competence to establish an ad hoc tribunal
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter; its establishment violated the
principle of jus de non evocando; it was contrary to the U.N. Charter to
confer jurisdiction over individuals on the Tribunal since the Security
Council's authority was limited to states which pose threats to
international peace and security and did not extend to individuals; and, as
it was established by the Security Council, a political body, the Tribunal
was not an impartial independent judicial body. Each of these arguments
was rejected unanimously.7 '
9. Bagambiki et al.
On 9 October 1997, three individuals were indicted for committing
crimes against the Tutsi population and Hutu moderates living in
173. Final Report, supra note 11, $ 83. It is estimated that 170 Tutsi patients and five
members of staff at the Butare University hospital were killed by members of the
Presidential Guard and Interahamwe militia. Id.
174. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at 520 n.1716.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. The Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, Decision on the Defence
Motion on Jurisdiction, June 18, 1997. For an analysis of the decision, see Virginia Morris,
International Decisions: Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Decision on Jurisdiction, 92 AM. J. INT'L
L. 66, 67 (1997).
The Appeals Chamber dismissed an interlocutory appeal lodged against this decision
on 29 July 1997 since the appeal failed to set out the grounds upon which it was based. The
Appeals Chamber nevertheless stated that it would allow the defence to remedy the defect
and accordingly extended the time for filing a new motion of appeal. In the meantime, the
accused requested and was granted a change in counsel, and on 6 August 1997 the appeal
was withdrawn in order to avoid delaying the trial proceedings, See MORRIS & SCHARF,
supra note 12, at 555.
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Cyangugu prefecture.'7' Emmanuel Bagambiki, former prefect of
Cyangugu, was accused of publicly expressing anti-Tutsi sentiments and
preparing lists of people to eliminate. These lists were given to soldiers
and Interahamwe militiamen with orders to arrest and kill the persons
whose names were listed. Together with Lieutenant Samuel Imanishimwe,
former commander of the Cyangugu barracks-who was apprehended in
Nairobi and transferred to Arusha on 18 August 1997 17-- and Yusuf
Munyakazi, leader of the Interahanwe militia in Cyangugu prefecture, who
is still at large, Bagambiki is also accused of ordering refugees who had
sought shelter at Cyangugu Cathedral to be moved to Cyangugu Stadium,
where a large number were massacred. On 5 June 1998, Bagambiki was
arrested in Togo and was subsequently transferred to Arusha where he
pleaded not guilty to the charges against him on 19 April 1999.'1
10. Semanza
On 23 October 1997, Judge Aspegren confirmed an indictment against
Laurent Semanza, former bourgmestre of Bicumbi commune and
President of the MRND Party in the greater Kigali area." Semanza-who
allegedly presided over several meetings to plan and organise the massacre
of the local Tutsi population, "participated in the distribution of weapons
to and the training of Interahamwe militiamen, and assisted in [the
organisation and execution of] massacres at Ruhanga and Musha church in
the Gikoro commune, as well as those in Bicumbi commune"-pleaded
not guilty to seven counts contained in the indictment on 18 November
1997.10 The trial of the accused was scheduled to commence on 3 February
1999. However, it was postponed after the accused's lawyer failed to
appear in court.'13 A new date for the commencement of the trial has not
yet been set.
E. Collective Indictments
In order to demonstrate that the Rwanda genocide was carefully
planned and carried out as a result of collusion between senior political,
military and civil officials, in March 1998 the Prosecutor submitted an
indictment for confirmation which charged Theoneste Bagosora and
178. The Prosecutor v. Bagambiki, Case No. ICTR-97-36-I, Indictment, Oct. 9, 1997.
179. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at 490-91.
180. Press Release, Former Prefect of Cyangugu Pleads Not Guilty to Seven Counts on His
Initial Appearance, U.N. Doc. ICT'RINFO-9-2-179 (Apr. 19, 1999).
181. The Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-I, Indictment, Oct. 23, 1997.
182. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 12, at 492.
183. Press Release, Defence Counsel for Laurent Semanza Replaced, U.N. Doc.
ICTR/INFO-9-2-159 (Feb. 3, 1999).
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twenty-eight others with conspiracy to commit genocide. However, Judge
Khan dismissed the indictment on the grounds that it was not maintainable
in the form presented and that as a single judge he lacked jurisdiction to
confirm the indictment with respect to sixteen of the individuals named
therein who had been indicted previously.'9 An appeal against the
dismissal of the indictment failed.185
Persisting with her strategy of trying the accused collectively, in
August 1998 the Prosecutor filed three collective indictments. The first
included the military leaders: Bagosara, Kabiligi, Ntabakuze and
Nsengiyumva. The second indictment included those allegedly involved in
organising various massacres carried out in the Butare prefecture:
Nyiramasuhuko, Ntahobali, Nsabimana, Nteziryayo, Ndayambaje and
Kanyabashi. The third included the political leadership of the MRND:
Karemera, Rwamakuba, Ngirumpatse, Nzirorera, Kajelijeli and two others
whose identity has still to be disclosed. While the "political" indictment
was confirmed without incident, ' several persons named in the other
indictments opposed the confirmation on the basis that since different
judges had confirmed the original indictments against the ten accused and
as a confirming judge could not hear the trial on the merits, neither of the
presently constituted Trial Chambers could hear the two cases. They
further maintained that they had the right to be tried by the same judges
who had dealt with their case since their respective initial appearances. At
the time of writing, this matter is currently pending before the Appeals
Chamber.
V. INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE OFFICE OF INTERNAL
OVERSIGHT SERVICES
Despite these achievements, the Tribunal has been plagued by severe
managerial and administrative difficulties since its inception that have
significantly affected the successful performance of its mandate. In
response to a request from the General Assembly and following
184. Since eleven of the accused were in the custody of the Tribunal, namely Bagosora,
Kabiligi, Ntabakuze, Nsengiyumva, Imanishimwe, Ntagerura, Nyiramasuhuko, Nsabimana,
Kanyabashi, Ndayambaje and Ntahobali, Judge Khan held that only the Trial Chamber
could amend the indictments against these persons. The five previously indicted persons
who were still at large were under the jurisdiction of the confirming judges. The Prosecutor
v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-37-I, Dismissal of Indictment, Mar. 31, 1998.
185. Press Release, Appeals Chamber Dismisses Appeal by the Prosecution and the Defence
in the Cases of Bagosora and Rutaganda Respectively, U.N. Doc. IC'TRJINFO-9-2-126
(1998).
186. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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complaints received from staff members and member States, the Office of
Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit and investigation
of the Tribunal, uncovering numerous operational deficiencies of a
substantial nature."' In its report published in February 1997, OIOS found
that the Tribunal constantly ignored the United Nations rules and
regulations and had no accounting system, as well as incomplete and
unreliable financial records- it had employed personnel in key positions
who were unqualified for their posts, and despite its function, had a dearth
of qualified lawyers and investigators; it lacked the courtroom and
detention facilities necessary to cope with the increasing number of
accused; and it was handicapped by insufficient support from the United
Nations Headquarters in New York." In addition, the report criticised the
open feuding between the Office of the Prosecutor in Kigali and the
Registry in Arusha and pointed out that -[t]he slow development of
witness-related programmes hampered trial preparation and has the
potential to impact negatively on the trials."' 8'
The report concluded that substantial changes needed to be made to
the Tribunal, and recommended that the United Nations provide it with
more administrative and financial support and that better links had to be
forged with its counterpart in The Hague in order to improve its
performance."' On the basis of the report, the Secretary-General
requested and received the resignation of both the Registrar and the
Deputy Prosecutor, the two officials identified in the report as being
largely responsible for the Tribunal's problems."' Agwu Okali (Nigeria)
and Bernard Muna (Cameroon) were appointed as their replacements,
respectively. Following his appointment, the new Registrar-in addition to
implementing improved financial control measures-reorganised the
structure of the Registry and replaced a number of senior officials.
In a follow-up investigation conducted by OIOS at the start of 1998,
the Tribunal was commended for acting on the majority of
187. See G.A. Res. 213C, U.N. GAOR, 50"' Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/50/49 (1996).
The Office of Internal Oversight Services was requested to inspect the Tribunal "with a
view to identifying problems and recommending measures to enhance the efficient
utilization of resources, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its fifty-first
session." Id. 9.
188. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight
Services, U.N. Doc. A/51/789 (1997).
189. Id. 54.
190. Id. IT 75-76.
191. Makau Mutua, Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, 11
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 167, 185 (1997); see also 2 Dismissed from Tribunal on Rwanda,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1997, at A3.
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recommendations made in the previous report. However, 010S did
highlight a number of areas in which corrective action was still required-
namely the management of the defence counsels department, the use of
voluntarily donated funds, witness protection, the management of the




Although it has essentially operated in the shadow of the Yugoslavia
Tribunal since its inception, the achievements the Tribunal has made in the
pursuit of international justice has enabled it to take its own place in the
chronicles of the development of international humanitarian law. As a
result of the strong support it has received from the international
community, all but ten of the forty-eight individuals publicly indicted are
in custody. Five of those individuals arrested have been convicted of
genocide and sentenced to various terms ranging from fifteen years to life.
In addition, two further trials are currently underway, with the verdicts
expected in both trials by the end of 1999.
Since its resources are limited, it is inevitable that the Tribunal will be
able to try only a small percentage of those persons who participated in the
genocide. Nevertheless, given the sporadic outbreaks of ethnic violence
that are still occurring in Rwanda and the surrounding States, "the
symbolic effect of prosecuting even a limited number of the perpetrators,
especially the leaders who planned and instigated the genocide, [will] have
considerable impact on national reconciliation, as well as on deterrence of
such crimes in the future.' 93  If the international community is truly
sincere about its wish to bring peace and security in the Great Lakes
region, it is therefore essential that it continue to support the Tribunal's
efforts to bring to justice the perpetrators of one of the worst genocides
committed since the end of the Second World War.
192. Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight
Services, U.N. Doc. A/52/784 (1998).
193. Akhavan, supra note 54, at 509.
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